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Strategic Disclosure of Valuable Information within Competitive
Environments
Young-Ro Yoon1
Abstract
Can valuable information be disclosed intentionally by the informed agent even within a competitive
environment? In this article, we bring our interest into the asymmetry in reward and penalty in the
payoﬀ structure and explore its eﬀects on the strategic disclosure of valuable information. According to
our results, the asymmetry in reward and penalty is a necessary condition for the disclosure of valuable
information. This asymmetry also decides which quality of information is revealed for which incentive;
if the penalty is larger than the reward or the reward is weakly larger than the penalty, there exists an
equilibrium in which only a low quality type of information is revealed, in order to induce imitation. On
the other hand, if the reward is suﬃciently larger than the penalty, there exist equilibria in which either
all types or only high quality type of information is revealed, in order to induce deviation. The evaluation
of the equilibrium in terms of expected payoﬀ yields that the equilibrium where valuable information is
disclosed strategically dominates the equilibrium where it is concealed.
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JEL classification Numbers: D82; M52
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1 Introduction
"Hope for the best, prepare for the worst"
Frequently, agents compete with one another in a common or similar task and, due to this competitive
environment, they are often evaluated based on their performance. While many factors can be considered
in these evaluations, one main factor can be his performance in relation to the performances of other
competitors. If, in completing a task, an agent was successful but his peers were also successful, he will
be given a less positive evaluation than if he alone had been successful, because the reward or the prize
would be shared. On the other hand, if an agent was not successful but other competitors also failed,
the penalty or the blame would similarly be shared, resulting in a less negative evaluation than if he
alone was unsuccessful. As a result of such an evaluation scheme, when carrying out a task each agent
must consider not only his own performance but also the performances of other agents with whom he is
competing.
Consider one agent carrying out a given task in a competitive environment; if he has meaningful
information related to the task, we can predict that he may not want to reveal it to others, in order to be
the only agent who completes the task successfully. If information he has is perfect, our prediction may
be correct. However, if that information is, although meaningful, not perfect, concealing it from other
agents may not be the best strategy, because it could lead the agent in the wrong direction and cause him
to be the only agent who fails at the task. In this case, given that the shared failure of the other agents
mitigates our agent’s failure by sharing the blame under the relative evaluation scheme, revealing his
information could produce a better situation than concealing it as he may thus seduce some agents into
following him in the wrong direction. This reasoning reveals the possibility that meaningful information
could, for this purpose, be revealed even in a competitive environment. If this is the case, then what
about the possibility that even high quality information could be revealed? If we only consider an agent
with meaningful information, it seems unlikely. However, if we also consider other agents involved in the
competitive environment, the answer can be not decisive because other agents’ responses to the revealed
information must be considered.
Then what characterizes the condition under which valuable information is revealed even in a com-
petitive environment? If it is revealed, which quality of information will be revealed? When and why
does the agent with valuable information intend to reveal it? The aim of this paper is to analyze the
possibility of strategic information disclosure within competitive environments, by providing the answers
to these proposed questions.
The eﬀects of an asymmetry in reward and penalty in the payoﬀ structure on the strategic information
disclosure is of particular interest. Sometimes whether the reward or the penalty is stressed can be given
objectively. Or agents can interpret the given situation subjectively as one biased toward either reward
or penalty via the following reasoning. For example, if a given task is presumed to be relatively easy,
then even if the agent successfully completes the task he will earn a relatively small reward because such
success was presumed or taken for granted. However, an agent who fails at such an easy task would earn
a large penalty because success was strongly anticipated. On the other hand, if a given task is evaluated
as being diﬃcult, then even if our agent is unsuccessful, the penalty will not be as large as it would be
for the easy task because less is expected of the agent. However, the agent who successfully completes a
diﬃcult task may earn a large reward. Following this reasoning, agents can subjectively interpret a easy
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(hard) task as one from which they have less (much) to gain and much (less) to lose. In other words, if the
task is evaluated as being relatively easy (hard), then the agent can evaluate her situation subjectively
as one in which the payoﬀ structure is biased toward the penalty (reward).2 Below it is shown that the
asymmetry in reward and penalty, objectively given or subjectively interpreted, is the critical factor in
deriving the equilibrium in which valuable information is strategically revealed. The proposed results
specifically imply that the strategic information disclosure is related to whether agents hope for the best
or prepare for the worst, which is aﬀected by the asymmetry in reward and penalty.
The model with which we deal in this article can be described as follows: Two heterogeneous agents,
one partially informed (henceforth M) and one uninformed (henceforth U) about the unknown true state,
compete with each other in the common task of making a forecast about the true state. The signal which
M observes and its precision are both private information. M can decide whether to forecast as the leader
or delay and forecast simultaneously with U. On the other hand, U is required to forecast only in round
2. After both players forecast, the true state is revealed and each player earns his payoﬀ according to the
correctness of both players’ forecasts, under a relative evaluation scheme. Under these set-up, M must
decide both when to act (either in round 1 or round 2) and how to act (whether to be truthful in revealing
his signal or not). In the case of U, his action depends on M’s realized timing of forecast because this
determines whether meaningful information about true state is observable or not.
The following points describe the main characteristic of the model. First, a waiting option given to the
informed agent makes it possible to analyze his strategic decision regarding information disclosure. For
example, if an agent expects that others can mimic his action which contains valuable private information,
and he is displeased by this fact, he may delay his action if possible as a way to conceal his information.
If, on the other hand, he regards other agents’ same actions as beneficial, he may prefer to reveal his
information rather than conceal it. In this way, controlling the timing of action is a way in which an agent
can control the flow of his information. In this model, the waiting option is given only to the informed
agent in order to restrict our attention to the strategic revelation of meaningful information. Second,
we assume that no cost is imposed for a delay of forecast. This is in order to rule out the possibility
that M, despite his desire to delay, avoids doing so due to the cost. Therefore, M’s strategic decision on
when to forecast can be understood as a voluntary decision derived only from the usefulness of the delay.
Third, U has a chance to infer two dimensions (signal and information quality) of M’s private information
according to M’s realized timing of forecast. If M does not delay and so his forecast is observable, U
has the opportunity to infer M’s private signal. Also, the timing of M’s forecast itself always gives U a
chance to infer the precision of M’s signal, which is private information. Hence, how U forms a belief
about and infers M’s types (signal and information quality) from the available opportunity play key roles
in characterizing the equilibrium.
The main results of analysis can be summarized as follows. It is shown that M always reveals his
private signal truthfully, regardless of his timing of forecast and the payoﬀ structure. Hence, his decision
on the timing of his forecast is no more than a decision regarding the disclosure of his valuable information.
Significantly, as there is no cost for a delay, if M chooses forecast without a delay, this is his voluntary
decision and moreover attributable to his desire to intentionally show his private signal to U. However, his
2For example, think about the penalty kick in a soccer game. From the viewpoint of goalkeeper (kicker), this is a situation
in which there is nothing to lose (gain) and much to gain (lose) because the penalty kick is presumed to favor the kicker
rather than the goalkeeper; that is, it is assumed that successfully making the goal is relatively easy for the kicker, while
preventing the goal is diﬃcult for the goalkeeper.
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equilibrium strategies as to when to forecast and which quality of information he reveals vary according
to the asymmetry in reward and penalty as follows.
If the penalty is larger than the reward, the unique equilibrium is the partially revealing separating
equilibrium in which M’s information is revealed only if it is of low quality. M’s weak confidence in
the correctness of his information, induced by the low quality of information, makes M concerned about
being penalized. Hence, M strategically reveals his information in order to induce U’s imitation, which
enables him to avoid the risk of being penalized alone. In this equilibrium, U correctly expects that the
information thus revealed is of low quality. However, under a payoﬀ structure biased toward the penalty,
U also intends to avoid being penalized alone and therefore imitate M’s forecast if observable.
On the other hand, if the reward is larger than the penalty, each agent has an incentive to be
diﬀerentiated from the other, in order to earn the reward alone. However, being diﬀerentiated also bears
the risk of being penalized alone. Hence what matters is whether the reward is suﬃciently large enough
to make agents take the risk of being penalized alone. If the reward is weakly larger than the penalty, the
concern of being penalized yields a partially revealing separating equilibrium in which M’s information
is revealed only if it is of low quality; like the situation in which the penalty is stressed, M’s action here
is motivated by the desire to be imitated. On the other hand, if the reward is suﬃciently larger than the
penalty, there exists a partially revealing separating equilibrium in which M’s information is revealed only
if it is of high quality. Moreover, there also exists a pooling equilibrium in which M’s information is always
revealed regardless of its quality. For both cases, the disclosure of information is an attempt on M’s part
to induce U’s divergence for the sake of earning the reward alone. In the partially revealing separating
equilibrium, although U infers that the revealed information is of high quality, he uses a mixed strategy
and deviates from M’s forecast with a positive probability. In the pooling equilibrium, U always deviates
from M’s forecast if observable although he knows that it contains valuable information correlated with
the true state. These U’s equilibrium strategies are based on his incentive to be diﬀerentiated, even
though he is the one uninformed about the true state; an incentive aﬀected by the payoﬀ structure
strongly biased toward the reward.
In this way, the asymmetry in reward and penalty plays a critical role in deciding which quality of
information is revealed. The main intuition is as follows: If the stick is stressed, the agents are each
biased toward preparing for the worst case in which he is penalized alone. On the other hand, if the
carrot is strongly stressed, each agent is biased toward hoping for the best case in which he alone gets
the reward. If the carrot is weakly stressed, both are mixed.
In addition, it is shown that if the reward and the penalty are symmetric, the unique equilibrium
is the pooling equilibrium in which M always forecasts after a delay. Therefore his private signal is not
revealed at all. In other words, the asymmetry in reward and penalty is a necessary condition for the
strategic disclosure of M’s private signal. Also, if we consider the case in which the precision of M’s signal
is completely known, unlike the case in which it is private information, there exists no equilibrium in
which M’s high-quality information is revealed. This implies that the incomplete information about the
precision of M’s signal is a necessary condition for the disclosure of M’s very precise information.
Although we mainly restrict our attention to the equilibrium in which M’s private signal is strategically
revealed, there also exists a pooling equilibrium in which M’s private signal is not revealed at all. This
type of equilibrium is derived if i) the reward is greater than the penalty and ii) U forms a belief regarding
M’s information quality under which he imitates U’s forecast if observable (which is oﬀ-the-equilibrium-
path). Hence, for the case in which the reward is stressed, the multiple equilibria are derived. As is well
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known, this is due to the fact that any of U’s arbitrary beliefs can be assigned for the outcome which
never occurs along the equilibrium path. Regarding this, the evaluation of the equilibrium in terms of
expected payoﬀ yields that, under all cases, the pooling equilibrium in which M’s private signal is not
revealed at all is dominated.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3
introduces a model. Section 4 deals with M’s truthfulness in revealing his private signal. Section 5
characterizes the equilibrium. In Section 6, we modify the model and go over the cases in which i) the
precision of M’s signal is public information and ii) the reward and the penalty are symmetric. We also
consider the equilibrium in which M’s information is not revealed and evaluate the equilibria of all cases
in terms of expected payoﬀ. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Conner and Rumelt (1991) and Conner (1995) explicitly mention the possibility of gaining a strategic
advantage by being imitated. Both articles propose, using the model of firms’ activities in the market,
that allowing other firms to imitate or copy can be a dominant strategy if a positive network externality
is present. In their models, the network externality, defined exogenously, is positive in the sense that
other firms’ imitative activities can increase the size of the market; that is, although the pie must be
shared between firms exhibiting identical behaviors, if the pie itself grows, thus increasing each firm’s
slice, imitation can be advantageous. The positive externality defined in our model is diﬀerent from that
of their models in following sense; the externality in this model is positive in that encouraging other’s
imitative behavior makes it possible for an agent to avoid the risk of being the sole agent penalized. Also,
in this model whether the externality is positive or negative is derived endogenously from the payoﬀ
structure and the informed agent’s information quality.
Poyago-Theotoky (1999), Rosenkranz (2001), Perez-Castrillo and Sandonis (1996), and De Fraja
(1993) deal with the topic of information disclosure within competitive environments, although they do
so in the contexts diﬀerent from that of this paper. Poyago-Theotoky (1999) analyzes a non-tournament
model of R&D where firms are engaged in cost-reducing innovation. It is shown that when spillovers
of information are treated as endogenous firms never disclose any of their information if their R&D are
chosen non-cooperatively. On the other hand, in our model, we focus on the information disclosure
even in the non-cooperative setting. Rosenkranz (2001) considers a setting in which firms first decide
on cooperation and then participate either as a joint venture or competitors in an auction. Each firm’s
dilemma is that while (some) know-how should be revealed in order to determine the possible benefits of
cooperation, doing so also opens the firm to the risk of being exploited. According to Rosenkranz (2001),
cooperation is a pooling equilibrium strategy if only a little know-how is transferred. It also characterizes
the condition under which only the agents with low know-how cooperate. Under similar feature, Perez-
Castrillo and Sandonis (1996) argue that although the cooperation of R&D or RJV can be aﬃrmative in
the pre-competitive state of R&D, the spillover of technology or know-how of this stage can be negative
later because it can induce a more competitive situation in the product market. However, the main focus
of their model is to find the existence of incentive contracts that induce firms to share their know-how
in RJVs facing technical uncertainty. De Fraja (1993) considers the setting in which a firm can have
an incentive to reveal knowledge to its rival during the patent race. In his model, although the rival’s
success may be unfavorable in short-term, if there are the product market benefits as its consequence, a
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firm may intend to help a rival by revealing knowledge. In this sense, it shares the similar feature with
Conner and Remelt (1991) and Conner (1995).
The topic of information sharing has been analyzed widely in depth in I.O. literature, in the context
of information sharing in an oligopoly market. For literature about information sharing in an oligopoly
market, see Shapiro (1973), Clarke (1983), Fried (1984), Vives (1984, 1990), Gal-Or (1985, 1986), Li
(1985), Raith (1996), and Creane (1998).3 In general, this literature explores the conditions under
which firms benefit from sharing information and the incentives under which firms commit to the rule of
information sharing.4 Although this literature is relevant to the model discussed in this paper, information
sharing between agents is not the main topic of this paper because only one agent is privately informed.
Instead our model focuses on the informed agent’s strategic incentive to reveal meaningful information.
Also, we de not address the topic of commitment. Whether to reveal private information or not is
determined by the informed agent’s private incentive in the setting of non-cooperative competition. In
addition, much of the literature assumes that information is revealed truthfully by assuming that an
agency is responsible for transferring the information correctly or that the information is verifiable.5 In
our model, the truthfulness of the revealed information is not assumed but derived endogenously.
Gul and Lundholm (1995), Frisell (2003) and Mailath (1993) use the notion, in their analysis, that
the timing of action reveals private information. In Gul and Lundholm (1995) and Frisell (2003), each
agent infers the precision of the other agent’s signal from the timing of action. Both models consider
only the fully separating equilibrium and derive the equilibrium of the endogenous timing of action.6 The
main contribution of Gul and Lundholm (1995) is to show that the phenomenon of informational cascade
can happen endogenously even when all players’ information is used eﬃciently, if only the informational
externality matters. Frisell (2003) characterizes the equilibrium of the endogenous timing of actions using
a model in which two firms select a product design when its true value is not known. The results propose
that if the payoﬀ externality is positive or relatively weakly negative, the more-informed firm acts as the
leader. On the other hand, if the payoﬀ externality is strongly negative, the more-informed firm acts as
the follower because it has more to gain from outwaiting the other firm. Although the setting is a bit
diﬀerent, our model proposes an equilibrium in which the (more) informed firm acts as the leader despite
the fact that the payoﬀ externality is strongly negative. This result is based on the observation that
the revealed information can induce the other agent to deviate from it, which is not considered in Frisell
(2003). Mailath (1993) addresses the topic of market entrance using set-up similar to that of this model
in that only one informed firm has a waiting option and the uninformed firm does not. In the unique
stable equilibrium, the informed firm operates as the leader although its ex-ante profit is higher when it
produces simultaneously with the uninformed firm. The intuitive explanation is that the informed firm’s
delay reveals the private information that the market is profitable even though the firm would like to
conceal it by delaying. In his model, as the precision of the informed firm’s information is assumed to be
perfect, how the quality of information matters is not considered. In our model, on the other hand, when
3Vives (1990), Raith (1996) and Creane (1998), especially, provide a good survey of this issue.
4Usually it is assumed that firms commit to share information truthfully before they actually observe their private signals.
5Unlike other papers in the literature, Ziv (1993) addresses the topic of truthfulness in information revelation. It attempts
to endogenize the incentives for truthful information sharing in an oligopoly by providing a mechanism under which the
truth-telling of private information is in its own best interest, despite the fact that verification is impossible.
6 It is assumed that there exists one-to-one mapping such that the observation of timing of action reveals the precision
(variance) of the signal perfectly. Also as the variances are drawn from the nonatomic distribution and only the symmetric
equilibrium is dealt with, the possibility of the simultaneous action by both agents is not considered.
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the informed agent uses a waiting option, his private signal about the true state cannot be inferred. The
uninformed agent can only infer the quality of the private signal from the informed agent’s delay.
Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite and Suzumura (1990) provides the suﬃcient condition under which there
is a complete revelation of private information (the so-called unraveling result). In their model, what the
privately informed agents decide is whether to reveal some or all of their information to other agents. That
is, the decision is about the optimal amount of information they share with other agents. In our model,
what the informed agent decides is the quality of information to disclose, not the amount of information.
Milgrom (1981) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) show the possibility that information sharing can be
derived endogenously from a strategic choice, not from the setting of the commitment. When it is known
that an agent is privately informed, if the information is verifiable and the information disclosure is
not costly, all private information is revealed (whether it is the favorable choice or not) because the
unfavorable information cannot be concealed.7 In our model, whether information is favorable or not is
based not on its contents but on the quality of information. Hence, in our model the so-called unravelling
equilibrium can be defined as one in which private information is revealed endogenously regardless of its
quality.
Broadly speaking, the literature regarding herding and anti-herding can be said to be related to the
model addressed in this article.8 (For examples of this literature, see Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hir-
shleifer, and Welch (1992), Scharfstein and Stein (1992), Trueman (1994), Avery and Chevalier (1999),
and Eﬃnger and Polborn (2001).) This literature usually assumes that the ordering of action is given
exogenously and analyzes the subsequent players’ responses against the exogenously revealed prevailing
information. What we are interested in, on the other hand, is how the information which the subse-
quent player can make use of is generated endogenously from strategic reasoning, while considering the
subsequent player’s response to the revealed information.
3 Model
Suppose there are two agents i ∈ {M,U} whose jobs are to provide a forecast about the unknown
true state of a forthcoming period. These two agents are the agencies which work independently in the
forecasting industry.9 The true state is w ∈ {H,L} and these two states are mutually exclusive. The
prior probability of each state is Pr(w = H) = Pr(w = L) = 12 . Before making a forecast, one agent has
the opportunity to observe his own signal θ ∈ Θ = {h, l} which is correlated with the true state. The
other agent has no chance to observe any informative signal correlated with the true state. Throughout
this paper, we denote the agent who can observe θ as M (informed agent), and the other agent who
7If information is concealed, other agents can perfectly infer that information is unfavorable and therefore the privately
informed one wants to conceal it. This reasoning is similar to that through which, in Mailath (1993), the informed firm acts
as the leader in the unique stable equilibrium.
8However, in our model as the agent who responds to the revealed information is the uninformed one, the conventional
meaning of herding or anti-herding, which is the disregard of private information, does not happen. Instead, imitation and
deviation from the prevailing information are derived. Also the reputation eﬀect which is usually considered in the literature
addressing herding and anti-herding is not dealt with explicitly in this paper.
9We want to distinguish our case from those in which the agents are hired by one principal and the discussion regarding
the optimal contract provided by the principal can be the main topic. We adopt the relative evaluation scheme as given and
focus on the topic of the strategic information disclosure under competitive environment characterized by relative evaluation
scheme. This also makes the model free from subordinate concerns, such as why the uninformed agent is hired by the
principal.
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cannot as U (uninformed agent). It is assumed that θ ∈ {h, l} is private information, so that U does not
know which signal is observed by M.
The signal θ partially reveals information about the true state in following manner: Pr(θ = h|w =
H) = Pr(θ = l|w = L) = p and Pr(θ = h|w = L) = Pr(θ = l|w = H) = 1 − p where p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢ . Here,
p measures the precision of M’s signal θ, so that it can also be interpreted as the quality of information.
As p approaches 12 , it means that his signal becomes less informative and as p approaches 1, it means
that his signal becomes more informative about the true state. We assume that p is private information
and it is drawn from the uniform distribution Z (p) where p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
= P .
M’s action set is denoted by {am, tm}. Here, am ∈ F = {h, l} denotes M’s forecast. If am = h
(am = l), it denotes that M’s forecast is w = H (w = L). M has two rounds during which he can forecast;
this forecast is irreversible and tm ∈ T = {t1, t2} denotes M’s timing of forecast where t1 (t2) denotes
round 1 (round 2). M can decide when to forecast endogenously. If he forecasts in round 1 (round 2),
then it is denoted by tm = t1 (tm = t2). Although M delays his forecast, no cost is imposed for his delay.10
On the other hand, U is required to forecast only in round 2. Hence, U’s action set is Au = {au} where
au ∈ F = {h, l}.
If tm = t1, that is, if both agents forecast sequentially, U can observe M’s forecast before announcing
his own forecast. On the other hand, if tm = t2, that is if both agents forecast simultaneously, U has no
chance to observe M’s forecast. In this case, U knows that M did not take the opportunity to forecast in
round 1.
Each agent’s ex-post payoﬀ, which is given by the market, is determined after the realization of the
true state w and is conditional on the correctness of both agents’ forecasts, ai and a−i, as follows:
w au = w au 6= w
am = w 1, 1 γ,−φ
am 6= w −φ, γ −1,−1
Table 1: Ex-post payoﬀ structure, γ > 1 and φ > 1
We assume that market does not know which agent is informed and not informed and therefore
considers only the correctness of both agents’ finalized forecasts in evaluating the agents. The payoﬀs
assigned when the forecast turns out to be correct, i.e., ai = w, can be interpreted as a reward or prize
and that given when it turns out to be wrong, i.e., ai 6= w, can be interpreted as a penalty or blame given
by the market.
This payoﬀ structure is designed to incorporate the competitive environment two agents face. Suppose
that both agents forecasted identically. Then if their forecasts reveal the true state correctly, both earn
+1 and, if not, both earn −1. On the other hand, if both agents’ forecasts are diﬀerent, the agent who
made a correct forecast gets γ > 1 and the agent who made a false forecast gets −φ < −1. In other
words, if an agent’s forecast turns out to be correct, the other agent’s identical forecast causes a negative
externality because the reward must be divided. On the other hand, if an agent’s forecast turns out to
10Although we assume that a delay cost is imposed for his delay, under the given model, the additional result we can
derive is that M would not delay his forecast if a delay cost is greater than his expected gain from a delay even in the case
where a delay is beneficial. If a delay is not beneficial, a delay cost would not cause any change.
7
be wrong, the other agent’s identical forecast causes a positive externality because the penalty will be
shared. However, as the true state is revealed only after both agents forecast, whether ai = w or ai 6= w
is not verified in advance and therefore an uncertainty is embedded. For the majority of the analysis,
we assume that γ 6= φ.11 Hence, our case is either γ > φ or γ < φ where the first (second) denotes the
case in which the payoﬀ structure is biased toward the reward (penalty). Through this approach, we can
analyze the eﬀects of asymmetry in reward and penalty on each player’s strategic behavior.
The timing of the game is described as follows:
T1) Nature chooses θ ∈ {h, l} and p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢. M observes both θ and p. The ex-post payoﬀ structure
is announced.
T2) Before round 1 starts, M decides when to forecast (either in round 1 or in round 2, but not in
both) and whether to be truthful in revealing θ or not.
T3) Round 1 starts. M forecasts if he decided to do so. If not, he waits until round 2 starts.
T4) Round 2 starts. If M forecasted in round 1, U observes am and forecasts as the follower. If not,
both M and U forecast simultaneously.
T5) After two rounds are over, the true state w is revealed and each player earns his payoﬀ following
the ex-post payoﬀ structure.
A pure strategy for M is a pair of functions σm = (σm1, σm2) where i) σm1 : Θ×P −→ T is the choice
regarding the timing of forecast as a function of θ and p, and ii) σm2 : Θ× P × T −→ F is M’s choice of
forecast as a function of θ, p and tm. The pure strategy for U is σu = (σu1, σu2) where σu1 : am −→ au
is U’s forecast as a function of M’s forecast when tm = t1 (when am is observable) and σu2 is a forecast
when tm = t2 (when am is not observable). We also allow a mixed strategy for both players.
This model uses the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept. Within the model, there exist two types
private information, θ ∈ {h, l} and p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢. In the case of U, he will have the chance to infer θ only
if tm = t1. In this case, as am is observable, U forms a belief with regard to whether M is truthful in
revealing θ or not. Also, U can always observe M’s timing of forecast which conveys information about
p. That is, after observing tm ∈ {t1, t2}, U forms a belief regarding p. Let λ (am = θ) be U’s belief for
the truthfulness of M’s action and Z (p| tm) be a posterior belief over p. Then, each agent’s strategy σm,
σu and λ (θ = am), Z (p| tm) constitute a PBE if each agent’s ex-ante expected payoﬀs are maximized for
given beliefs λ (θ = am), Z (p| tm), and the other agent’s strategy. Also, in equilibrium, λ (θ = am) and
Z (p| tm) should be consistent with σm in the Bayesian sense. This can be formalized as follows:
Definition 1
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a pair of strategies for M and U, σ∗m = (σ∗m1 (p, θ) , σ
∗
m2 (p, θ, tm)),
σ∗u = (σ∗u1 (tm = t1, am) , σ
∗
u2 (tm = t2)) and beliefs of U, λ (am = θ) and Z (p|tm), such that:
1)
σ∗m ∈ arg max
tm∈{t1,t2},am∈{h,l}
πm (tm, am, σ∗u, p, θ, w) for all p and θ
2) The beliefs of U, λ (am = θ) and Z (p| tm), are derived from σ∗m (·), the prior beliefs, am if observ-
able, and tm, using Bayes’s rule whenever applicable.
11 In section 6.2, we go over the case in which the reward and the penalty are symmetric for comparison.
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3)
σ∗u1 ∈ arg max
au∈{h,l}
Z
πu (au, w, am, p; tm = t1) dZ (p| t1)
where
πu (·) = λ (·)
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr (w| θ = am)πu (am, au, w) + (1− λ (·))
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr (w| θ 6= am)πu (am, au, w)
4)
σ∗u2 ∈ arg max
au∈{h,l}
Z
πu (au, w, p; tm = t2) dZ (p| t2)
where
πu (·) = λ (·)
X
w∈{H,L}
X
θ∈{h,l}
Pr (w, θ)πu (am = θ, w, ·) + (1− λ (·))
X
w∈{H,L}
X
θ∈{h,l}
Pr (w, θ)πu (am 6= θ, w, ·)
4 Truthfulness in revealing θ
Note that M’s signal θ ∈ {h, l} is private information. As U can observe only the announced forecast am,
M can make a strategic decision on whether to be truthful in revealing θ or not. Here, M’s truthfulness in
revealing θ is important because it determines whether or not M’s true signal θ can be inferred perfectly
from observing am, which aﬀects U’s best response.
In this section, we show that, in regard to the truthfulness in revealing θ, M’s strategy to deviate from
θ is strictly dominated regardless of tm ∈ {t1, t2}. That is, M always reveals θ truthfully.12 This also
implies that in equilibrium U gives zero weight to the possibility that am 6= θ regardless of tm ∈ {t1, t2}.
This result simplifies the analysis which will be discussed in the subsequent sections.
First, consider the case in which M forecasts in round 1. In this case, from the following reasoning, it
can be checked that a pooling strategy cannot constitute an equilibrium. As M’s type is θ ∈ {h, l}, M’s
pooling strategy is either "am = h whether θ = h or θ = l." or "am = l whether θ = h or θ = l.". Note
that whether θ = h or θ = l, both cases are ex-ante symmetric to M. Hence, for each of U’s strategies,
the ex-ante expected payoﬀ from being truthful when θA = h should be the same as that for the case
in which θA = l. Also, the ex-ante expected payoﬀ from telling a lie when θA = h should be the same
as that of the case in which θA = l. Hence, if being truthful (or deviating from θ) is A’s best response
when θA = h, it should be the same when θA = l. Then, obviously M’s pooling strategy, "am = h
whether θ = h or θ = l" or "am = l whether θ = h or θ = l", cannot constitute an equilibrium because it
means that sometimes being truthful is better and sometimes telling a lie is better, according to the given
private signal θ ∈ {h, l} although it is ex-ante symmetric. Hence, a pooling strategy cannot constitute
the equilibrium.
Lemma 1
Suppose that tm = t1. Then in regard to the truthfulness in revealing θ, a pooling strategy cannot
constitute the equilibrium.
12As mentioned in Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite and Suzumura (1990), we believe that the condition that an agent reveals
the private information truthfully should be an equilibrium conclusion rather than an assumption.
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Next M’s separating strategies are "am = h (am = l) if θ = h (θ = l)" and "am = h (am = l) if θ = l
(θ = h)". In the following, we show that the only separating strategy which constitutes an equilibrium is
the first one, which implies that M is truthful in revealing θ.
Without loss of generality, assume that θ = h. Then, M’s posterior beliefs regarding the true state are
Pr(w = H| θ = h) = p and Pr(w = L| θ = h) = 1−p. In the following, Eπm (am = h, ·, w) is M’s expected
payoﬀ when am = h for given θ = h (that is, when he is truthful in revealing θ) and Eπm (am 6= θ, ·, w)
is the expected payoﬀ when am = l for given θ = h (that is, when he deviates from θ). If tm = t1 and
therefore M’s forecast is observed, U decides whether to imitate or deviate from am.
Consider the case in which U imitates am. Then,
Eπm (am = h, au = am, w| θ = h) =
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ = h)πm (am = h, au = am, w)
= 2p− 1
Eπm (am = l, au = am, w| θ = h) =
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ = h)πm (am 6= h, au = am, w)
= 1− 2p
Next, consider the case in which U deviates from am. Then,
Eπm (am = h, au 6= am, w| θ = h) =
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ = h)πm (am = h, au 6= am, w)
= pγ − (1− p)φ
Eπm (am = l, au 6= am, w| θ = h) =
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ = h)πm (am = l, au 6= am, w)
= −pφ+ (1− p)γ
Now, let μ ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that U imitates M’s action, i.e., μ = Pr (au = am). Then,
Eπm (am = h, au, w| θ = h)−Eπm (am = l, au, w| θ = h)
= μ
⎛
⎝ X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w|h)πm (am = h, au = am, w)
⎞
⎠+ (1− μ)
⎛
⎝ X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w|h)πm (am = h, au 6= am, w)
⎞
⎠
−μ
⎛
⎝ X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w|h)πm (am = l, au = am, w)
⎞
⎠− (1− μ)
⎛
⎝ X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w|h)πm (am = l, au 6= am, w)
⎞
⎠
= − (γμ− 2μ− φ− γ + μφ) (2p− 1) > 0
because γμ− 2μ− φ− γ + μφ < 0 for all μ ∈ [0, 1].13 Thus, regardless of U’s best response in round 2,
M’s best response is to reveal his private information truthfully. Also note that this result holds for all
p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. In the following sections where p is private information, U forms a posterior belief regarding
p from observing M’s timing of forecast. For example, if his posterior belief regarding p from observing
13γμ− 2μ− φ− γ + μφ = μ (γ + φ− 2)− γ − φ. So μ T γ+φγ+φ−2 =⇒ γμ− 2μ− φ− γ + μφ T 0. However as
γ+φ
γ+φ−2 − 1 =
2
γ+φ−2 > 0, for all μ ∈ [0, 1], γμ− 2μ− φ− γ + μφ < 0.
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tm = t1 is p ∈ (a, b) where a, b ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¤
and a < b, still it should be true that am = θ because the
truthfulness should hold for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. The case in which θ = l should yield the same result because
both cases are ex-ante symmetric. This then implies that if tm = t1, the only equilibrium is the separating
equilibrium in which M is truthful in revealing θ.
Lemma 2
When tm = t1, the unique equilibrium is a separating equilibrium in which M reveals θ truthfully, i.e.,
am = θ.
Next, consider the case in which M decides to forecast in round 2. In this case, M knows that U
randomizes his forecast because U has only the prior belief for the true state that Pr(w = H) = Pr(w =
L) = 0.5. Although U forms a posterior belief for p from observing tm = t2, as am is not observable, no
valuable information about the true state is conveyed. Here, we assume the following:
Assumption 1
Suppose U has no chance to observe am. In this case, M believes that Pr(au = h) = Pr(au = l) = 0.5.
Without loss of generality, assume that θ = h. Then, under Pr(w = H| θ = h) = p and Pr(w = L| θ =
h) = 1− p,
Eπm (am = h, au, w| θ = h) = 1
2
⎛
⎝ X
au∈{h,l}
⎛
⎝ X
w∈{H,L}
Pr (w| θ)πm (am = h, au, w)
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠
=
1
2
(2p− φ+ pγ + pφ− 1)
Eπm (am = l, au, w| θ = h) = 1
2
⎛
⎝ X
au∈{h,l}
⎛
⎝ X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ)πm (am = l, au, w)
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠
=
µ
−1
2
¶
(2p− γ + pγ + pφ− 1)
and
Eπm (am = h, au, w| θ = h)−Eπm (am = l, au, w| θ = h) = 1
2
(2p− 1) (γ + φ+ 2) > 0
Therefore, for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, γ > 1 and φ > 1, if tm = t2, M’s best response is to reveal θ truthfully.
The above analysis can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1
M reveals her signal θ truthfully for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
regardless of the timing of his forecast.
If we recall the given ex-post payoﬀ structure (Table 1), the result that M has no incentive to ignore his
own information θ is quite intuitive. According to Table 1, the ex-post payoﬀs under ai 6= w are strictly
smaller than those under ai = w. That is, Min πi (ai = w, a−i) = 1 > −1 = Max πi (ai 6= w, a−i).
Therefore it is natural that M’s primary objective should be to make a correct forecast. Hence, when no
other valuable information is available, M has no incentive to ignore θ, which is meaningful in the sense
that it is correlated with the true state. This is why M’s strategy to deviate from θi is strictly dominated.
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An important implication of Proposition 1 is that, especially when tm = t1, because of the requirement
that U’s belief should be consistent in equilibrium, U assigns zero probability to the possibility that M
deviates from θ when tm = t1, i.e., λ (θ = am) = 1 where λ (·) is U’s belief that M’s is truthful in revealing
θ. That is, if am is observable, U can infer θ perfectly. From M’s standpoint of view, it also implies that
the only option he can use to maximize his ex-ante expected payoﬀ is a decision on the timing of forecast.
Moreover, as he should reveal θ truthfully regardless of his timing of forecast, the decision on the timing
of forecast is no more than a decision on the disclosure of his private signal θ: If tm = t1, it is in order to
reveal θ to U and if tm = t2, it is in order to prevent θ from being revealed to U.
5 Equilibrium
5.1 Partially revealing separating equilibrium
In our model, M’s information quality, which is his type, is a continuum, i.e., p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, while the action
set is discrete, i.e., tm ∈ {t1, t2}. Hence the observance of M’s timing of forecast does not reveal M’s type
p perfectly. It is in this sense that we use the term "partially revealing separating equilibrium".
In round 2, U faces one of the following two situations: tm = t1 and tm = t2. As mentioned, if M
did not forecast in round 1, i.e., tm = t2, U’s best response in round 2 is to randomize his forecast, i.e.,
z = [0, 1] where z = Pr(au = h) because no information correlated with the true state is available and
both au = h and au = l attain the same ex-ante expected payoﬀs.
Next, consider the case in which M forecasted in round 1, i.e., tm = t1. Note that originally U faces
two dimensions of incomplete information; one regarding θ ∈ {h, l} and the other regarding p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢.
However, from Proposition 1, U can infer θ perfectly from observing am. Hence, what we have to consider
now is solely U’s posterior belief regarding p inferred from observing that tm = t1. That is, tm conveys
information about p and U infers it based on his belief.
Here, we assume that M’s strategy as to the timing of forecast is a monotone function of the informa-
tion quality. In the following, as we are considering a partially revealing separating equilibrium, x, y 6= 12
and x, y 6= 1.
Definition 2
1) Monotone increasing strategy: ∃x ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
s.t. for p ∈
¡
1
2 , x
¢
, tm = t1 and for p ∈ (x, 1), tm = t2.
2) Monotone decreasing strategy: ∃y ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
s.t. for p ∈ (y, 1), tm = t1 and for p ∈
¡
1
2 , y
¢
, tm = t2.
Even M knows that if he forecasts in round 1, U can infer θ perfectly. As no cost is imposed for
a delay of forecast, if M forecasts in round 1 it must be assumed that this is his voluntarily decision,
unconstrained by considerations other than the usefulness of the delay. That is, if M forecasts without
delaying until round 2, it is in order to give U a chance to infer θ perfectly. Also, the monotone increasing
(decreasing) strategy means that he wants to reveal information which is of relatively low (high) quality.
Below it is shown that the conditions under which the conjectured M’s strategy is supported as the
equilibrium strategy are described as a function of γ and φ. Therefore, the derived results show how the
given payoﬀ structure, especially the asymmetry in reward and penalty, aﬀects M’s decision on the timing
of forecast and U’s best response. In particular, as M’s decision on the timing of forecast is no more than
a decision on the disclosure of his superior information, the results provide the reasoning behind when
and why M intends to reveal his valuable private information and allow U to infer it.
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5.1.1 Monotone increasing strategy
First, we assume that M’s strategy is monotone increasing. Without loss of generality, assume that
am = h. From Lemma 2, after observing am = h, U infers that θ = h. Also, U has a posterior belief
regarding p such that p ∈
¡
1
2 , x
¢
. Then,
Eπu (au = am, w| tm = t1) =
Z ⎛
⎝ X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ = h)πu (au = am, w)
⎞
⎠ dZ (p| tm = t1) (1)
=
Z
p∈( 12 ,x)
(p− (1− p)) dZ (p)
=
1
2
(2x− 1)
Eπu (au 6= am, w| tm = t1) =
Z ⎛
⎝ X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ = h)πu (au 6= am, w)
⎞
⎠ dZ (p| tm = t1) (2)
=
Z
p∈( 12 ,x)
(p (−φ) + (1− p)γ) dZ (p)
=
µ
−1
4
¶
(φ− 3γ + 2xγ + 2xφ)
where (1) is the expected payoﬀ when U imitates M’s forecast and (2) is the expected payoﬀ when U
deviates from M’s forecast. Then,
Eπu (au = am, w| tm = t1)−Eπu (au 6= am, w| tm = t1) = 1
4
(4x− 3γ + φ+ 2xγ + 2xφ− 2)
We denote
f (x) ≡ 4x− 3γ + φ+ 2xγ + 2xφ− 2
Then, U’s best response in round 2 when am is observable can be described as follows: i) f (x) > 0 =⇒
U imitates am, ii) f (x) < 0 =⇒ U deviates from am, and iii) f (x) = 0 =⇒ U is indiﬀerent between
imitating and deviating from am.
In the following, we denote Eπm (tm) as M’s ex-ante expected payoﬀ when he forecasts at tm ∈ {t1, t2}.
Note that if tm = t2, U randomizes his forecast in round 2 and in this case, from this assumption, M
believes that Pr(au = h) = Pr(au = l) = 12 . Then,
Eπm (tm = t2) =
1
2
⎛
⎝ X
au∈{h,l}
⎛
⎝ X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ = h)πm (am, au, w)
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠ (3)
=
1
2
(2p− φ+ pγ + pφ− 1)
CASE 1: When f (x) > 0.
In this case, if M forecasts in round 1, U imitates M’s forecast in round 2. Then,
Eπm (tm = t1) =
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ = h)πm (am, au = am, w) (4)
= 2p− 1
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Hence from (3) and (4),
Eπm (tm = t1)−Eπm (tm = t2) =
µ
−1
2
¶
(pγ − φ− 2p+ pφ+ 1) (5)
The computation then yields the following result.
Lemma 3
Suppose that γ < φ. If p ∈
³
1
2 ,
φ−1
γ+φ−2
´
, tm = t1 and if p ∈
³
φ−1
γ+φ−2 , 1
´
, tm = t2. If tm = t1, U
imitates am.
Proof of Lemma 3
In the appendix.
CASE 2: When f(x) < 0.
In this case, if M forecasts in round 1, U deviates from M’s forecast in round 2. Then,
Eπm (tm = t1) =
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ)πm (am 6= au) (6)
= pγ − φ+ pφ
From (3) and (6),
Eπm (tm = t1)−Eπm (tm = t2) = p
µ
1
2
γ +
1
2
φ− 1
¶
+
1
2
− 1
2
φ (7)
Then, if p R φ−1γ+φ−2 , Eπm (tm = t1) T Eπm (tm = t2). However, this is contradictory to the conjecture
that M’s strategy is monotone increasing. Hence, this case is excluded.
Case 3: When f(x) = 0.
In this case, if M forecasts in round 1 U is indiﬀerent to imitating or deviating from M’s forecast.
Now, suppose that z is the probability that U imitates am when am is observable, i.e., z = Pr(au = am).
Then
Eπm (tm = t1) = z (p− (1− p)) + (1− z)(pγ − (1− p)φ) (8)
Eπm (tm = t2) =
1
2
(p− (1− p)) + 1
2
(pγ − (1− p)φ) (9)
and
Eπm (tm = t1)−Eπm (tm = t2) =
µ
−1
2
¶
(2z − 1) (pγ − φ− 2p+ pφ+ 1) (10)
Hence if z = 12 , Eπm (tm = t1) = Eπm (tm = t2) for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. That is, when am is observable,
if U imitates (or deviates from) am with probability 12 , M is indiﬀerent regarding the choice between
forecasting in round 1 or round 2 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. Now, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires that
U’s posterior belief over p should be consistent to M’s strategy. Thus, as f (x) = 0 at x = 3γ−φ+22γ+2φ+4 , we
only have to check the condition under which x = 3γ−φ+22γ+2φ+4 ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
is satisfied.
Lemma 4
Suppose that φ < γ < 3φ + 2. Then, for p ∈
³
1
2 ,
3γ−φ+2
2γ+2φ+4
´
, tm = t1 and for p ∈
³
3γ−φ+2
2γ+2φ+4 , 1
´
,
tm = t2. If tm = t1, U imitates or deviates from am with probability 12 .
Proof of Lemma 4
In the appendix.
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5.1.2 Monotone decreasing strategy
Now we assume that M’s strategy is monotone decreasing. Without loss of generality, assume that
am = h. After observing am = h, U infers that θ = h. Also, U’s posterior belief from observing tm = t1
is that p ∈ (y, 1). Then
Eπu (au = am, w| tm = t1) =
Z ⎛
⎝ X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ = h)πu (au = am, w)
⎞
⎠ dZ (p| tm = t1) (11)
=
Z
p∈(y,1)
(p− (1− p)) dZ (p)
= y
Eπu (au 6= am, w| tm = t1) =
Z ⎛
⎝ X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ = h)πu (au 6= am, w)
⎞
⎠ dZ (p| tm = t1) (12)
=
Z
p∈(y,1)
(p (−φ) + (1− p)γ) dZ (p)
=
µ
−1
2
¶
(φ− γ + yγ + yφ)
where (11) is the expected payoﬀ when U imitates M’s action and (12) is the expected payoﬀ when U
deviates from M’s action. Then,
Eπu (au = am, w)−Eπu (au 6= am, w) = 1
2
(2y − γ + φ+ yγ + yφ)
We denote
g (y) ≡ 2y − γ + φ+ yγ + yφ
U’s best response in round 2 can thus be described as follows: i) g (y) > 0 =⇒ U imitates am, ii)
g (y) < 0 =⇒ U deviates from am. iii) g (y) = 0 =⇒ U is indiﬀerent to the distinction between imitating
and deviating from am. Then, from the procedure analogous to that used in the case in which M’s
strategy is monotone increasing, we can derive the following result.
Lemma 5
Suppose that γ > 3φ + 2. Then, for p ∈
³
γ−φ
γ+φ+2 , 1
´
, tm = t1 and for p ∈
³
1
2 ,
γ−φ
γ+φ+2
´
, tm = t2. If
tm = t1, U imitates or deviates from am with probability 12 .
Proof of Lemma 5
In the appendix.
Then, the results of the above analysis can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 2: (Partially revealing) Separating equilibrium
1) Suppose that γ < φ. If p ∈
³
1
2 ,
φ−1
γ+φ−2
´
, tm = t1 and if p ∈
³
φ−1
γ+φ−2 , 1
´
, tm = t2. If tm = t1, U
imitates am.
2) Suppose that φ < γ < 3φ+ 2. If p ∈
³
1
2 ,
3γ−φ+2
2γ+2φ+4
´
, tm = t1 and if p ∈
³
3γ−φ+2
2γ+2φ+4 , 1
´
, tm = t2. If
tm = t1, U imitates or deviates from am with probability 12 .
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3) Suppose that γ > 3φ+ 2. If p ∈
³
1
2 ,
γ−φ
γ+φ+2
´
, tm = t2 and if p ∈
³
γ−φ
γ+φ+2 , 1
´
, tm = t1. If tm = t1,
U imitates or deviates from am with probability 12 .
For all three cases, if tm = t2, U randomizes his forecast, i.e., Pr(au = h) = [0, 1].
Consider the situation in which the payoﬀ structure is biased toward the penalty, i.e., γ < φ. If M
forecasts without a delay, U infers that M’s private signal θ is of low quality. Hence, the credibility he
assigns to the correctness of M’s information may not be high. However, as the payoﬀ structure is biased
toward the penalty, U’s main concern is to avoid being the only agent who announces a wrong forecast.
Hence, in spite of his weak belief for the correctness of θ, U imitates M’s forecast. Of course, as θ is
correlated with the true state, it seems reasonable for U to rely on it. However, it should be noted that
the payoﬀ structure biased toward the penalty also aﬀects U’s strategic behavior of imitating am. By
forecasting identically, U can at least avoid the worst case in which he earns the lowest payoﬀ πu = −φ
when the penalty is strongly stressed. U’s response when the payoﬀ structure is biased toward the reward,
as stated below, clearly shows how the given payoﬀ structure aﬀects U’s strategic response against the
observed am and the inferred θ.
Although M observes an informative signal, even he is not free from the concern that he could be
penalized because his information is not perfect. However, at least as M observes the signal correlated
with true state, his belief for the correctness of his information matters. If it is relatively high, i.e., p ∈³
φ−1
γ+φ−2 , 1
´
, M gives more weight to the possibility that his information may be correct. If forecast turns
out to be correct, U’s identical forecast causes a negative payoﬀ externality because a good reputation
or reward must be shared. Thus, he regards U’s identical forecast as a strategic substitute and therefore
wants to prevent his private signal from being revealed. This is why M delays his forecast when his
information is of relatively high quality. On the other hand, if the precision of his private signal is
relatively low, i.e., p ∈
³
1
2 ,
φ−1
γ+φ−2
´
, M is not quite sure about the correctness of his information, so he
is greatly concerned about the possibility that he could be penalized alone. If his forecast turned out to
be wrong, the other’s identical forecast would cause a positive payoﬀ externality because the penalty or
blame would be shared. Hence, in this case, M regards U’s identical forecast as a strategic complement
and therefore wants to induce it by revealing his private signal to U. This explains why M forecasts
without a delay when his information is of low quality, even when a waiting option is not costly.
Next, consider the case in which the payoﬀ structure is biased toward the reward, i.e., γ > φ. Note
that the reward γ can be earned only if an agent is the only one who forecasted correctly. That is,
alongside being correct, forecasting diﬀerently from the other player is a necessary condition for earning
γ. So the incentive to be diﬀerentiated is initiated. However, how strongly the reward is stressed over the
penalty matters because a diﬀerent forecast bears a risk of announcing a wrong forecast alone. That is,
each player considers whether the reward is suﬃciently large enough to make him risk of being penalized
alone.
Suppose that φ < γ < 3φ + 2. This corresponds to the case in which the payoﬀ structure is weakly
biased toward the reward. If M forecasts without a delay, U infers that θ is of low quality. However, U
also intends to be diﬀerentiated. Hence, compared to the case in which the penalty is stressed, U has a
relatively small incentive to imitate M’s forecast when it is observable. This may lead U to use a mixed
strategy and sometimes deviate from M’s forecast in order to earn γ. Actually, if U uses a mixed strategy,
M is indiﬀerent between tm = t1 and tm = t2 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. The condition that U’s belief over p
should be consistent to M’s equilibrium strategy yields that M reveals his private signal only if it is of low
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quality, i.e., p ∈
³
1
2 ,
3γ−φ+2
2γ+2φ+4
´
. Although the payoﬀ structure is biased toward the reward, the reward is
not suﬃciently large enough to make him take the risk of being penalized alone. Hence, like the case in
which the penalty is stressed, he reveals his information if it is of low quality, in order to be imitated by
U.
On the other hand, if γ > 3φ + 2, this corresponds to the case in which the payoﬀ structure is
strongly biased toward the reward. In an equilibrium, U infers that M’s revealed information is of high
quality. However, he uses a mixed strategy and deviates from M’s forecast with a positive probability
while ignoring am based on the high quality information. Interestingly, M’s information is revealed only
if it is of high quality, i.e., tm = t1 for p ∈
³
γ−φ
γ+φ+2 , 1
´
. This equilibrium strategy for M can be explained
by the following reasoning. When M expects that U is likely to deviate from am, if he intends to reveal
his private signal it is better to do so when the precision of his signal is relatively high. If U deviates from
what the relatively imprecise information signals, U’s forecast is more likely to be correct compared to
the case in which U deviates from what the relatively precise information signals. That is, if information
is relatively precise, it is better to reveal it. On the other hand, if information is relatively imprecise, it
is better to conceal it. Therefore, M reveals his information only if it is of high quality. In this way, the
payoﬀ structure which is strongly biased toward the reward induces both players to take the risk of being
penalized alone, which yields the interesting result that M’s private signal is revealed only if it is of high
quality.
In sum, there exists a partially revealing separating equilibrium in which M forecasts voluntarily
without a delay in order to reveal his private signal to U. However, M’s motivations for acting so diﬀer
according to the given payoﬀ structures. If the penalty is larger than the reward or the reward is weakly
larger than the penalty, M’s information is revealed only if it is of low quality, in order to induce U’s
imitation for the sake of avoiding the risk of being penalized alone. On the other hand, if the reward is
suﬃciently larger than the penalty, M’s information is revealed only if it is of high quality, in order to
induce U’s divergence for the sake of earning a reward alone. In particular, the result that, according
to whether φ < γ < 3φ + 2 or γ > 3φ + 2, the diﬀerent quality of information is revealed against U’s
same equilibrium strategy also reveals how the given payoﬀ structure aﬀects M’s strategic decision on the
disclosure of his valuable information.
5.2 Pooling equilibrium
According to the set-up of the model, M has two pooling strategies: i) tm = t1 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
and
ii) tm = t1 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. As we are primarily interested in M’s strategic incentive to reveal his
information, in this section we restrict our attention to the pooling equilibrium in which M forecasts
without a delay for all qualities of information.14
Consider the following strategy for M: tm = t1 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. If U observes that tm = t1 which
is on the equilibrium path, U’s posterior belief regarding p is p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. On the other hand, for the
situation in which U observes that tm = t2 which never occurs along the equilibrium path, we can assign
any value to U’s arbitrary posterior belief regarding p. However, it is important to note that, regardless
of U’s posterior belief regarding p, U’s best response in round 2 is still to randomize his forecast because
am is not observable and therefore θ cannot be inferred. That is, U’s posterior belief regarding p from
observing tm = t2, which is oﬀ-the-equilibrium path, does not aﬀect U’s best response and therefore it
14The other pooling equilibrium in which tm = t2 for all p ∈
¡
1
2
, 1
¢
is discussed in Section 6.3.
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does not aﬀect M’s decision on tm ∈ {t1, t2}. What M should consider is whether he intends to i) show θ
in order to induce U’s imitation or deviation or ii) conceal θ and make U randomize a forecast.
The analysis yields the following result:
Proposition 3: Pooling equilibrium
1) Suppose that γ > 3φ+ 2. Then, tm = t1 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. If tm = t1, U deviates from am.
2) Suppose that γ = 3φ + 2. Then, tm = t1 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. If tm = t1, z ≤ 12 where z =
Pr (au = am).
For both cases, if tm = t2, U randomizes his forecast in round 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
In the appendix.
Proposition 3 indicates that for the pooling equilibrium in which tm = t1 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
to be
supported, i) the reward should be suﬃciently larger than the penalty and ii) U deviates from am when
observable. If the reward is strongly stressed, even U, who is uninformed about the true state, intends
to deviate from am if observable because he is willing to take the risk of being penalized alone for the
sake of earning γ. This incentive to be diﬀerentiated also applies to M. If M expects that U intends to be
diﬀerentiated always by deviating from am, then it would be better for M to always reveal his signal to U.
If he delays his forecast and therefore U has no chance to observe am, it sometimes may be that am = au
because U randomizes a forecast. On the other hand, if he forecasts without a delay and therefore am
is revealed, one necessary condition for earning γ, which is that am 6= au, is always guaranteed. This
explains why M always reveals his private signal to U.
6 Discussion
6.1 When information quality is public information
In this section, in the interest of comparison, we consider the case in which the precision of M’s private
signal is public information. Note that Proposition 1, which states that M’s best response is to reveal θ
truthfully, should also hold in this case because being truthful is his best response for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
.
First, we derive U’s best response in round 2. If tm = t2, U’s best response is to randomize his
forecast. If tm = t1, U observes am and infers θ perfectly. In this case, U’ best response in round 2 is as
follows:
Lemma 6
Suppose that p is public information. When tm = t1, U’s best response in round 2 can be described
as follows:
1) if γ > φ, for p ∈
³
1
2 ,
γ+1
γ+φ+2
´
, U deviates from am and for p ∈
³
γ+1
γ+φ+2 , 1
´
, U imitates am.
2) if γ ≤ φ, U imitates am for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
.
Proof of Lemma 6
In the appendix.
Now using backward induction, we derive M’s decision on the timing of forecast.
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Proposition 4
Suppose that p is public information. Then, M’s strategic decision on the timing of forecast can be
described as follows:
1) Suppose γ < φ. If p ∈
³
1
2 ,
φ−1
γ+φ−2
´
, tm = t1 and if p ∈
³
φ−1
γ+φ−2 , 1
´
, tm = t2.
2) Suppose γ > φ. If p ∈
³
1
2 ,
γ+1
γ+φ+2
´
, tm = t1 and if p ∈
³
γ+1
γ+φ+2 , 1
´
, tm = t2.
3) Suppose γ = φ. Then, for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, tm = t2.
Proof of Proposition 4
In the appendix.
Consider the situation in which the reward and the penalty are asymmetric. Contrary to the case
in which p is private information, if am is observable, U decides his best response while being perfectly
informed about the precision of M’s signal. The most distinctive result is derived when the payoﬀ structure
is biased toward the reward because, unlike the case where p is private information, M always intend to
be diﬀerentiated from U in order to earn γ. When am is observable and therefore θ is inferable, although
U knows that it is correlated with true state, if the precision is relatively low he does not give much credit
to the correctness of M’s information, i.e., p ∈
³
1
2 ,
γ+1
γ+φ+2
´
. Therefore, U diverges from it. If not, i.e.,
p ∈
³
γ+1
γ+φ+2 , 1
´
, although U still has an incentive to be diﬀerentiated, he considers the fact that making
a correct forecast is necessary to avoid a penalty. Then, as it is not quite attractive to ignore very precise
information, the incentive to be diﬀerentiated is dominated and U imitates M’s forecast. As the reward
is stressed, M also wants to be diﬀerentiated by inducing both agents’ diﬀerent forecasts. He knows that,
when p is relatively high, if θ is revealed, U imitates it and the opportunity for him to earn γ is foregone.
Hence, he uses a waiting option to prevent his private signal from being revealed. On the other hand, if
p is relatively low, i.e., p ∈
³
1
2 ,
γ+1
γ+φ+2
´
, M knows that U will deviate form his forecast if it is observable.
In this situation, it would be better for M to reveal θ in order to guarantee that am 6= au, which is a
necessary condition for earning γ. Here we can think about the possibility that the private signal of low
quality is revealed in order to be imitated, like the case in which p is private information. However note
that M’s strategic disclosure of low quality information is made while knowing that U will deviate from
am if observable. Also it can be verified that
∂
³
γ+1
γ+φ+2
´
∂γ > 0 and
∂
³
γ+1
γ+φ+2
´
∂φ < 0, which imply that as the
reward is more heavily stressed than the penalty, the parameter set of p for which M reveals his signal
increases. This result implicitly supports the reasoning that M’s disclosure of low quality information is
based on the incentive to induce U’s divergence. If the payoﬀ structure is biased toward the penalty, the
same equilibrium as in the case in which p is private information is derived, from the same reasoning.
In sum, if p is public information, M’s private signal is revealed only if it is of low quality. However,
the reasoning through which its disclosure is derived are diﬀerent according to the given payoﬀ structure.
If the penalty is stressed, the disclosure is motivated by the desire to be imitated for the sake of avoiding
the risk of being penalized alone. This is supported by U’s equilibrium strategy, which is to imitate M’s
forecast whenever it is observable. On the other hand, if the reward is stressed, the information disclosure
is an attempt to induce U’s divergence for the sake of earning the reward alone. This is supported by U’s
equilibrium strategy, which is to deviate from M’s forecast when the precision of information is relatively
low. If M’s information is of high quality, it is not revealed at all because of M’s incentive to conceal his
valuable information which is of high quality for the sake of avoiding U’s identical forecast.
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Corollary 1
If p is public information, there exists no equilibrium in which M’s very precise information is revealed.
That is, incomplete information about p is a necessary condition for the strategic disclosure of M’s very
precise information.
6.2 When the reward and the penalty are symmetric
In previous sections, we have considered the case in which the reward and the penalty are asymmetric.
According to Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, both the partially revealing separating equilibrium and
the pooling equilibrium in which tm = t1 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
are not supported when the reward and the
penalty are symmetric. This implicitly implies that if the reward and the penalty are symmetric, the
only equilibrium is the pooling equilibrium in which M’s signal is not revealed for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
.
Consider the following pooling strategy for M: “tm = t2 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
”. If U observes that M did
not forecast in round 1, although U’s posterior belief regarding p is p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, it does not aﬀect the fact
that U should randomize his forecast in round 2 because am is not observable. On the other hand, if U
observes that tm = t1 which never occurs along the equilibrium path, any arbitrary posterior belief over
p can be assigned to U. In the following, we show that if γ = φ, the given pooling strategy is supported
as the equilibrium strategy whether U believes that M’s strategy is monotone increasing or monotone
decreasing.
First, consider the case in which U believes that M’s strategy is monotone increasing; That is, ∃x ∈¡
1
2 , 1
¤
such that If p ∈
¡
1
2 , x
¢
, tm = t1 and if p ∈ (x, 1), tm = t2. Here, as we consider the case in
which U observes that tm = t1, the case in which x = 12 can be excluded. Then for tm = t1 which is
oﬀ-the-equilibrium path, U’s posterior belief regarding p is p ∈
¡
1
2 , x
¢
where x ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¤
. If U’s belief over
p is formed in this way, from (1) and (2),
Eπu (au = am, w| tm = t1) = 1
2
(2x− 1) > 0
Eπu (au 6= am, w| tm = t1)|φ=γ =
µ
−1
2
¶
γ (2x− 1) < 0
So U’s best response for tm = t1, which is oﬀ-the-equilibrium path, is always to imitate am if it is
observable.
Second, consider the situation in which U believes that M’s strategy is monotone decreasing; that is,
∃y ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¢
such that If p ∈ (y, 1), tm = t1 and if p ∈
¡
1
2 , y
¢
, tm = t2. As we consider the case in which U
observes that tm = t1, the case in which y = 1 is excluded. Then for tm = t1 which never occurs along the
equilibrium path, U’s posterior belief over p is p ∈ (y, 1) where y ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¢
. If U’s belief over p is formed
in this way, from (11) and (12),
Eπu (au = am, w| tm = t1) = y > 0
Eπu (au 6= am, w| tm = t1)|φ=γ = −γy < 0
So U’s best response for tm = t1, which is oﬀ-the-equilibrium path, is always to imitate am if it is
observable.
Therefore, regardless of U’s posterior belief, if γ = φ, U’s best response is to imitate am if it is
observable. Then if U deviates from the given pooling strategy and forecasts in round 1, as U imitates am
always, from (4), M’s expected payoﬀ from deviating the pooling strategy is Eπm (tm = t1) = 2p− 1. On
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the other hand, if he follows the given pooling strategy, from (3), Eπm (tm = t2)|φ=γ = 12 (2p− 1) (γ + 1).
Then
Eπm (tm = t1)− Eπm (tm = t2)|φ=γ =
µ
−1
2
¶
(2p− 1) (γ − 1) < 0
So M has no incentive to deviate from the pooling strategy, which is tm = t2 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
.
Proposition 5
Suppose that γ = φ. Then the unique equilibrium is the pooling equilibrium in which tm = t2 for all
p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
.
In addition, recall Proposition 4 which says that even in the case where p is public information, if
γ = φ, M always forecasts in round 2 after a delay. Hence, it is verifiable that if the reward and the
penalty are symmetric, M’s private signal is never revealed whether p is private or public information.
Corollary 2
Whether the quality of information is incomplete or not, the asymmetry in reward and penalty is the
necessary condition for M’s strategic disclosure of information.
6.3 When is information not revealed under the asymmetry in reward and penalty?
In previous sections, to focus on the matter of strategic information revelation within a competitive
environment, we dealt only with the pooling equilibrium in which the informed agent forecasts without
a delay. However, we can also consider the possibility that the informed agent delays his forecast always
and therefore his meaningful information is not revealed at all.
Suppose that M’s pooling strategy is given as follows: “tm = t2 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
”. If U observes that
tm = t2 which is on the equilibrium path, U’s best response in round 2 is still to randomize his forecast.
On the other hand, if U observes that tm = t1 which is oﬀ-the-equilibrium path, U can assign an arbitrary
posterior belief over p. Here, we still assume that M’s strategy is monotone. If M forecasts in round 2, it
is in order to conceal his private signal. Then, M’s pooling strategy “tm = t2 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
” is more
likely to be sustained if U is more likely to imitate am when it is observable. That is, between the beliefs
that M’s strategy is monotone increasing and monotone decreasing, the latter makes it harder for M to
deviate from the given pooling strategy than the former because U is more likely to imitate am when he
believes that am is based on the more precise information. Hence, we proceed with the analysis under
the conjecture that M’s strategy is monotone decreasing. Then, the analysis yields the following result:
Proposition 6
Suppose that U believes that M’s strategy is monotone decreasing for tm = t1 which is oﬀ-the-
equilibrium path. Then the pooling equilibrium in which tm = t2 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
is derived for following
cases:
1) When φ < γ < 3φ+ 2, if tm = t1, U believes that p ∈ (y, 1) where y ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¢
and imitates am.
2) When γ = 3φ + 2, if tm = t1, U believes that p ∈ (y, 1) where y ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
and imitates am.
If y = 12 , so U is indiﬀerent between imitating and deviating from am, it should be that z >
1
2 where
z = Pr(au = am).
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3) When γ > 3φ+2, if tm = t1, U believes that p ∈ (y, 1) where y ∈
³
γ−φ
γ+φ+2 , 1
´
and imitates am. If
y = γ−φγ+φ+2 , so U is indiﬀerent between imitating and deviating from am, it should be that z >
1
2 where
z = Pr(au = am).
Proof of Proposition 6
In the appendix.
The common features of the conditions under which this pooling equilibrium can be sustained are
as follows: i) the reward is greater than the penalty, ii) if tm = t1 which is the oﬀ-the-equilibrium-
path, U forms a belief over p under which he imitates am. The intuition for these two conditions is
straightforward; if the reward is greater than the penalty, M’s incentive to be diﬀerentiated is initiated.
Hence, if M expects that U will imitate his forecast and therefore a necessary condition for earning γ will
not be satisfied, M does not want to reveal his information and therefore intends to conceal his private
signal through a delay.
In addition, if we consider the case in which U believes that M’s strategy is monotone increasing for
tm = t1 which is oﬀ-the-equilibrium path, it can be checked that the pooling equilibrium in which M’s
signal is not revealed can be sustained in following cases: a) When φ < γ < 3φ+ 2, if x ∈
³
(3γ−φ+2)
2(γ+φ+2) , 1
´
or if x = (3γ−φ+2)2(γ+φ+2) and z ≥
1
2 . c) When γ = 3φ+2, if z ≥
1
2 . Hence, it is checked that the results derived
in Proposition 6 cover these results.
6.4 Evaluation of the equilibria in terms of expected payoﬀ
The derived results of the former sections can be summarized as follows:
γ < φ γ = φ φ < γ < 3φ+ 2 γ = 3φ+ 2 γ > 3φ+ 2
Partial revelation
√
(low p)
√∗ (low p) √ (high p)
Full revelation
√∗ √∗
No revelation
√ √ √ √
<Table 2: M’s information revelation according to payoﬀ structure>
If we focus on the equilibrium in which M’s private signal is revealed (partial and full revelation
equilibrium), we can see that the asymmetry in reward and penalty plays a critical role in deciding which
quality of information is revealed. This reflects the situations in which agents hope for the best or prepare
for the worst. In other words, if the stick is stressed, the agents are biased toward preparing for the worst
case in which they may be penalized alone. If the carrot is strongly stressed, each agent is biased toward
hoping for the best case in which he earns the reward alone.
Although we extend our interest into the equilibrium in which M’s private signal is not revealed, if
γ ≤ φ, there exists a unique equilibrium for each case. On the other hand, if γ > φ, a multiplicity of
the equilibrium is derived because, for the pooling equilibrium in which tm = t2 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, any
arbitrary posterior belief over p can be assigned to U for tm = t1 which is oﬀ-the-equilibrium path. Below,
we evaluate the multiple equilibria of each case in terms of the expected payoﬀ to see the relation of the
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equilibrium dominance. In table 2, the equilibrium marked as
√
* denotes the dominant equilibrium in
terms of expected payoﬀ.
Corollary 3
The evaluation of the equilibria in terms of expected payoﬀ yields the following results:
1) If γ ≥ 3φ+ 2, "Full revelation equilibrium" is a dominant equilibrium.
2) If φ < γ < 3φ+ 2, "Partial revelation equilibrium" is a dominant equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 3
In the appendix.
Therefore when the reward is greater than the penalty, under all cases, the pooling equilibrium in
which M’s private signal is not revealed for all p is dominated in terms of expected payoﬀ by other
equilibrium in which strategic information disclosure is derived.15
7 Concluding remarks
In this article, we explore the informed agent’s strategic incentive to reveal his valuable information within
a competitive environment characterized by a relative evaluation scheme. To restrict our attention on
the matter of the strategic disclosure of meaningful information, we allow a waiting option only to the
informed player. As we also assume that a delay is not costly, the informed agent’s decision on the timing
of forecast is no more than the voluntary decision regarding the disclosure of his information. We show
that, when the precision of the informed agent’s information is private information, the asymmetry in
the reward and penalty of the payoﬀ structure plays an important role in the informed agent’s decision
regarding which quality of information will be revealed for which incentive.
If the penalty is larger than the reward or the reward is weakly larger than the penalty, his information
is revealed only if it is of low quality; this revelation reflects the informed agent’s desire to be imitated
by the other agent in order to avoid the worst scenario, in which he alone fails and incurs a penalty.
On the other hand, if the reward is suﬃciently larger than the penalty, his information is revealed even
though — or only if — it is of high quality, in order to induce the other’s divergence for the sake of earning
the reward alone. If we consider the case in which the precision of the informed agent’s information is
completely known, the informed agent’s information is revealed only if it is of low quality. Hence, it is
verified that incomplete information about the quality of the informed player’s information is a necessary
condition for the disclosure of his very precise information. Also, if the reward and the penalty are
symmetric, the unique equilibrium is the one in which the informed agent’s information is not revealed.
Hence, the asymmetry in reward and penalty is a necessary condition for the disclosure of his meaningful
information. If the reward is strictly greater than the penalty, there also exists pooling equilibrium in
which the informed agent’s information is not revealed at all. However, the evaluation of the equilibria
in terms of expected payoﬀ yields that such a no revelation equilibrium is dominated by the partial- or
full revelation equilibrium for all cases.
15As is well known, the intuitive criterion D1 and D2 are usually used to eliminate the equilibrium based on the irrational
belief in the oﬀ-the-equilibrium path. However, in this model, the informed agent’s type, p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, is a continuum and the
action set, tm = {t1, t2} is discrete. Hence, in our model, it is diﬃcult to apply those criteria directly in order to check the
strategic stability of the derived equilibria.
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8 Appendix
The following simple computation result will be used frequently in the analysis. Recall that γ > 1 and
φ > 1.
Result 1: φ−1γ+φ−2 −
1
2 =
(φ−γ)
2(γ+φ−2) and
φ−1
γ+φ−2 − 1 = −
(γ−1)
(γ+φ−2) < 0.
8.1 Proof of Lemma 3
From (5), if p R φ−1γ+φ−2 , Eπm (tm = t1) Q Eπm (tm = t2). This satisfies that M’s strategy is monotone
increasing. Recall Result 1. Then i) if γ ≥ φ, Eπm (tm = t1) < Eπm (tm = t2) for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, ii) if
γ < φ, for p ∈
³
1
2 ,
φ−1
γ+φ−2
´
, Eπm (tm = t1) > Eπm (tm = t2) and for p ∈
³
φ−1
γ+φ−2 , 1
´
, Eπm (tm = t1) <
Eπm (tm = t2). Then the partially revealing separating equilibrium is supported only if γ < φ. In this
case, M is also indiﬀerent to the distinction between forecasting in round 1 and round 2 at p = φ−1γ+φ−2 ,
which means that x = φ−1γ+φ−2 . As f
³
x = φ−1γ+φ−2
´
= (3γ+3φ−2)(φ−γ)(γ+φ−2) > 0, the condition that f (x) > 0 is
also satisfied. Finally, the result can be summarized as follows: If γ < φ, for p ∈
³
1
2 ,
φ−1
γ+φ−2
´
, tm = t1
and for p ∈
³
φ−1
γ+φ−2 , 1
´
, tm = t2.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 4
We check the condition under which 3γ−φ+22γ+2φ+4 ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
is satisfied. Note that 3γ−φ+22γ+2φ+4 −
1
2 = −
(φ−γ)
(γ+φ+2)
and 3γ−φ+22γ+2φ+4 − 1 = −
(3φ−γ+2)
2(γ+φ+2) . So i) if γ > φ,
3γ−φ+2
2γ+2φ+4 >
1
2 and if γ ≤ φ,
3γ−φ+2
2γ+2φ+4 ≤
1
2 , ii) if γ < 3φ+ 2,
3γ−φ+2
2γ+2φ+4 < 1 and if γ ≥ 3φ+ 2,
3γ−φ+2
2γ+2φ+4 ≥ 1. Hence, a) if φ ≥ γ,
3γ−φ+2
2γ+2φ+4 /∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, b) if φ < γ < 3φ+ 2,
3γ−φ+2
2γ+2φ+4 ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
and c) if γ ≥ 3φ + 2, 3γ−φ+22γ+2φ+4 /∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. Therefore, x = 3γ−φ+22γ+2φ+4 ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
is satisfied
only if φ < γ < 3φ + 2. Then, the result can be summarized as follows: i) If φ < γ < 3φ + 2, for
p ∈
³
1
2 ,
3γ−φ+2
2γ+2φ+4
´
, tm = t1 and for p ∈
³
3γ−φ+2
2γ+2φ+4 , 1
´
, tm = t2.
8.3 Proof of Lemma 5
CASE 1) When g (y) > 0
In this case, if M forecasts in round 1, U imitates M’s forecast in round 2. Then the computation using
(5) yields that if p R φ−1γ+φ−2 , Eπm (tm = t1) Q Eπm (tm = t2). However, this contradicts the conjecture
that M’s strategy is monotone decreasing. Hence, this case is excluded.
CASE 2) When g (y) < 0
In this case, if M forecasts in round 1, U deviates from M’s forecast in round 2. Then the computation
using (5) yields that if p R φ−1γ+φ−2 , Eπm (tm = t1) R Eπm (tm = t2). This satisfies the condition that M’s
strategy is monotone decreasing. Recall Result 1. Then i) if γ ≥ φ, Eπm (tm = t1) > Eπm (tm = t2) for
all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, ii) if γ < φ, for p ∈
³
φ−1
γ+φ−2 , 1
´
, Eπm (tm = t1) > Eπm (tm = t2) and for p ∈
³
1
2 ,
φ−1
γ+φ−2
´
,
Eπm (tm = t1) < Eπm (tm = t2). Thus, the partially revealing separating equilibrium is supported only
if γ < φ. Moreover, in that case y = φ−1γ+φ−2 because M is indiﬀerent between forecasting in round 1
and round 2 at p = φ−1γ+φ−2 . Note that g
³
y = φ−1γ+φ−2
´
=
(γ−φ+γφ−γ2+2φ2−2)
(γ+φ−2) . If we denote the numerator
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as h (φ) ≡ 2φ2 + φ (γ − 1) + γ − γ2 − 2, then the following points can be checked: a) h (φ) is a convex
function, b) h (φ) attains the minimized value at φ = −γ−14 < 0 and c) h (φ = γ) = 2 (γ − 1) (γ + 1) > 0.
Hence, for φ such that γ < φ, h (φ) > 0. Note that the denominator is always strictly positive because
γ, φ > 1. Therefore, for γ < φ, g
³
y = φ−1γ+φ−2
´
> 0 and this contradicts to the condition that g(y) < 0.
Therefore this case is excluded.
CASE 3: When g(y) = 0
In this case, if M forecasts in round 1, U is indiﬀerent between imitating and deviating from M’s
forecast. From (10), if U imitates (or deviates from) am with probability 12 , M is indiﬀerent to the
choice between forecasting in round 1 and round 2 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. Then, for the requirement that
U’s posterior belief that p should be consistent, we only have to check whether γ−φγ+φ+2 ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
for which
g
³
y = γ−φγ+φ+2
´
= 0. Note that γ−φγ+φ+2 −
1
2 = −
(3φ−γ+2)
2(γ+φ+2) and
γ−φ
γ+φ+2 −1 = −
2(φ+1)
(γ+φ+2) < 0. So, if γ ≤ 3φ+2,
γ−φ
γ+φ+2 /∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, and if γ > 3φ + 2, γ−φγ+φ+2 ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. Hence, a partially revealing separating equilibrium
can be supported only if γ > 3φ+ 2. Therefore, the result can be summarized as follows: If γ > 3φ+ 2,
for p ∈
³
γ−φ
γ+φ+2 , 1
´
, tm = t1 and for p ∈
³
1
2 ,
γ−φ
γ+φ+2
´
, tm = t2.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 3
First, we check U’s best response. Suppose that U observes that tm = t1. Then
Eπu (au = am, w| tm = t1) =
Z ⎛
⎝ X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ = h)πu (au = am, w)
⎞
⎠ dZ (p| tm = t1) (A1)
=
Z
p∈( 12 ,1)
(p− (1− p)) dZ (p)
=
1
2
Eπu (au 6= am, w| tm = t1) =
Z ⎛
⎝ X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ = h)πu (au 6= am, w)
⎞
⎠ dZ (p| tm = t1) (A2)
=
Z
p∈( 12 ,1)
(p (−φ) + (1− p)γ) dZ (p)
=
µ
−1
4
¶
(3φ− γ)
Then,
Eπu (au = am, w| tm = t1)−Eπu (au 6= am, w| tm = t1) = 1
4
(3φ− γ + 2)
Hence, U’s best response in round 2 for tm = t1 is as follows: i) if 3φ + 2 > γ, U imitates, ii) if
3φ+ 2 < γ, U deviates, iii) if 3φ+ 2 = γ, U is indiﬀerent to both imitating and deviating from am.
Next, we consider M’s decision on his timing of forecast.
Case 1: When γ < 3φ+ 2
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If tm = t1, U imitates am in round 2. Then from (5), if p R φ−1γ+φ−2 , Eπm (tm = t1) Q Eπm (tm = t2).
Recall Result 1. Then i) if γ ≥ φ, for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, Eπm (tm = t1) < Eπm (tm = t2), ii) if γ < φ, for p ∈³
φ−1
γ+φ−2 , 1
´
, Eπm (tm = t1) < Eπm (tm = t2) and for p ∈
³
1
2 ,
φ−1
γ+φ−2
´
, Eπm (tm = t1) > Eπm (tm = t2).
Therefore, there is no case in which the pooling equilibrium, in which Eπm (tm = t1) > Eπm (tm = t2)
for p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, is supported.
Case 2: When γ > 3φ+ 2
If tm = t1, U deviates from am. Then from (7), if p T φ−1γ+φ−2 , Eπm (tm = t1) R Eπm (tm = t2). Recall
Result 1. Then i) if γ ≥ φ, for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, Eπm (tm = t1) > Eπm (tm = t2), ii) if γ < φ, for p ∈³
φ−1
γ+φ−2 , 1
´
, Eπm (tm = t1) > Eπm (tm = t2) and for p ∈
³
1
2 ,
φ−1
γ+φ−2
´
, Eπm (tm = t1) < Eπm (tm = t2).
Therefore, pooling equilibrium is supported only if γ ≥ φ and the given condition that γ > 3φ+2 satisfies
this. Hence, if γ > 3φ+ 2, the pooling strategy can be supported as the equilibrium strategy.
Case 3: When γ = 3φ+ 2
If tm = t1, U is indiﬀerent between imitating and deviating from am. Then from (8) and (9),
Eπm (tm = t1)−Eπm (tm = t2) = z (2p− pγ + φ (1− p)− 1) +
1
2
(pγ − φ− 2p+ pφ+ 1)
Note that if p Q φ−1γ+φ−2 , 2p − pγ + φ (1− p) − 1 R 0 where
φ−1
γ+φ−2 −
1
2 =
(φ−γ)
2(γ+φ−2) and
φ−1
γ+φ−2 − 1 =
− (γ−1)(γ+φ−2) < 0. So i) if γ ≥ φ, for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, 2p − pγ + φ (1− p) − 1 < 0 and ii) if γ < φ, for
p ∈
³
1
2 ,−
φ−1
2−φ−γ
´
, 2p − pγ + φ (1− p) − 1 > 0 and for p ∈
³
− φ−12−φ−γ , 1
´
, 2p − pγ + φ (1− p) − 1 <
0. Hence, when γ ≥ φ, if z < 12 , Eπm (tm = t1) > Eπm (tm = t2) for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
and if z ≥ 12 ,
Eπm (tm = t1) ≤ Eπm (tm = t2) for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. On the other hand, if γ < φ, M’s pooling strategy
cannot be sustained. Therefore, the pooling equilibrium can be supported only if γ ≥ φ and z ≤ 12 where
z = Pr (au = am). Moreover, the given condition that γ = 3φ+ 2 satisfies the condition that γ ≥ φ.
8.5 Proof of Lemma 6
Suppose that M forecasted in round 1. Without loss of generality, assume that am = h. Then, U infers
that θ = h. Hence, from her posterior beliefs about the true state such that Pr(w = H| θ = h) = p and
Pr(w = L| θ = h) = 1− p,
Eπu (am, au = am, w) =
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ = h)πu (am, au, w) (A3)
= 2p− 1
Eπu (am, au 6= am, w) =
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θ = h)πu (am, au, w) (A4)
= −pφ+ (1− p) γ
(A3) is U’s expected payoﬀ when U imitates M’s forecast and (A4) is the one when U deviates from
M’s forecast. Then,
Eπu (am, au = am, w)− Eπu (am, au 6= am, w) = p (γ + φ+ 2)− γ − 1
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Hence, if p T γ+1γ+φ+2 , Eπu(au = am) T Eπu(au 6= am). Note that γ+1γ+φ+2 − 12 = − (φ−γ)2(γ+φ+2) and
γ+1
γ+φ+2−1 = −
(φ+1)
(γ+φ+2) < 0. So if γ > φ,
γ+1
γ+φ+2 ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, but if γ ≤ φ, γ+1γ+φ+2 ≤
1
2 . Therefore the following
result can be proposed: 1) if γ > φ, for p ∈
³
1
2 ,
γ+1
γ+φ+2
´
, U deviates from am and for p ∈
³
γ+1
γ+φ+2 , 1
´
, U
imitates am. 2) if γ ≤ φ, U imitates am for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
.
8.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Without loss of generality, assume that θ = h. Also, recall (3) which is M’s expected payoﬀ when he
forecasts in round 2.
First, suppose that γ ≤ φ. In this case, M knows that, if he forecasts in round 1, U imitates am
for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. Then from (5) if p R φ−1γ+φ−2 , Eπm (tm = t1) Q Eπm (tm = t2). Recall Result 1.
Then, if γ < φ, φ−1γ+φ−2 ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
and if γ = φ, φ−1γ+φ−2 =
1
2 . Therefore, if γ < φ, for p ∈
³
1
2 ,
φ−1
γ+φ−2
´
,
Eπm (tm = t1) > Eπm (tm = t2) and for p ∈
³
φ−1
γ+φ−2 , 1
´
, Eπm (tm = t1) < Eπm (tm = t2). On the other
hand, if γ = φ, for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, Eπm (tm = t1) < Eπm (tm = t2).
Second, suppose that γ > φ. If p ∈
³
1
2 ,
γ+1
γ+φ+2
´
, M knows that, if he forecasts in round 1, U
deviates from am. Then from (7), if p T φ−1γ+φ−2 , Eπm (tm = t1) T Eπm (tm = t2). Note that 12 −
(φ−1)
γ+φ−2 =
(γ−φ)
2(γ+φ−2) > 0 for γ > φ, which implies that Eπm (tm = t1) > Eπm (tm = t2) for all p. So if p ∈
³
1
2 ,
γ+1
γ+φ+2
´
,
Eπm (tm = t1) > Eπm (tm = t2). On the other hand if p ∈
³
γ+1
γ+φ+2 , 1
´
, M knows that if he forecasts
in round 1, U imitates aM . In this case, note that if p R φ−1γ+φ−2 , Eπm (tm = t1) Q Eπm (tm = t2)
where 12 >
(φ−1)
γ+φ−2 for γ > φ. This implies that Eπm (tm = t1) Q Eπm (tm = t2) for all p. Hence for
p ∈
³
γ+1
γ+φ+2 , 1
´
, Eπm (tm = t1) < Eπm (tm = t2).
8.7 Proof of Proposition 6
Consider the case in which U believes that M’s strategy is monotone decreasing. That is, U believes
as follows: "There exists a critical value y ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¢
such that if p ∈ (y, 1), tm = t1 and if p ∈
¡
1
2 , y
¢
,
tm = t2." As we are considering the case in which U observes that tm = t1, the case in which y = 1 is
excluded. Under this belief, if U observes that tm = t1, from (11) and (12), U’s best response is as follows:
If y > γ−φγ+φ+2 , U imitates am, if y <
γ−φ
γ+φ+2 , U deviates from am and if y =
γ−φ
γ+φ+2 , U is indiﬀerent.
Note that γ−φγ+φ+2 −
1
2 = −
(3φ−γ+2)
2(γ+φ+2) and
γ−φ
γ+φ+2 − 1 = −
2(φ+1)
(γ+φ+2) < 0. Then, U’s best response in round 2
for tm = t1 can be summarized as follows.
Lemma A.1.
For tm = t1 which is oﬀ-the-equilibrium path, if U believes that M’s strategy is monotone decreasing,
U’s best response for tm = t1 can be described as follows.
1) If γ < 3φ+ 2, U imitates am for all y ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¢
.
2) If γ = 3φ+ 2, U imitates am for y ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
and U is indiﬀerent for y = 12 .
3) If γ > 3φ + 2, U deviates from am for y ∈
h
1
2 ,
γ−φ
γ+φ+2
´
, U is indiﬀerent for y = γ−φγ+φ+2 and U
imitates am for y ∈
³
γ−φ
γ+φ+2 , 1
´
.
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Now recall the following M’s decision on tm ∈ {t1, t2} against U’s best response when am is observable.
Case A) When U imitates am if it is observable:
1) If γ ≥ φ =⇒ Eπm (tm = t1) < Eπm (tm = t2) for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
2) If γ < φ =⇒
⎧
⎨
⎩
Eπm (tm = t1) > Eπm (tm = t2) for p ∈
³
1
2 ,
φ−1
γ+φ−2
´
Eπm (tm = t1) < Eπm (tm = t2) for p ∈
³
φ−1
γ+φ−2 , 1
´
Case B) When U deviates from am if it is observable.
1) If γ ≥ φ =⇒ Eπm (tm = t1) > Eπm (tm = t2) for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
2) If γ < φ =⇒
⎧
⎨
⎩
Eπm (tm = t1) < Eπm (tm = t2) for p ∈
³
1
2 ,
φ−1
γ+φ−2
´
Eπm (tm = t1) > Eπm (tm = t2) for p ∈
³
φ−1
γ+φ−2 , 1
´
Case C) When U is indiﬀerent between imitating and deviating from am if it is observable:
1) i) if γ > φ, then for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
or ii) if γ < φ and p ∈
³
φ−1
γ+φ−2 , 1
´
, z Q 12 =⇒ Eπm (tm = t1) T
Eπm (tm = t2).
2) If γ < φ and p ∈
³
1
2 ,
φ−1
γ+φ−2
´
, z T 12 =⇒ Eπm (tm = t1) T Eπm (tm = t2).
Now we check whether M’s pooling strategy, “tm = t2 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
”, can be sustained as the
equilibrium strategy or not. Recall Lemma A.1.
Case 1) When γ < 3φ + 2 : In this case, for all y ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¢
, U imitates am. Then, from Case A, the
given pooling strategy is sustained only if φ ≤ γ < 3φ+ 2.
Case 2) When γ = 3φ+ 2 : First, if y ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, U imitates am. Then, from Case A, the given pooling
strategy is sustained if γ = 3φ+ 2. Second, if y = 12 , U is indiﬀerent to either imitation or deviation am.
Then, from Case C, the given pooling strategy can be sustained only if z > 12 .
Case 3) When γ > 3φ + 2 : First, if y ∈
h
1
2 ,
γ−φ
γ+φ+2
´
, U deviates from am. Then, from Case B, the
given pooling strategy cannot be sustained. Second, if y = γ−φγ+φ+2 , as U is indiﬀerent, from Case C, the
given pooling strategy can be sustained only if z > 12 . Finally, if y ∈
³
γ−φ
γ+φ+2 , 1
´
, U imitates am. Then,
from Case A, the given pooling strategy can be sustained.
This completes the proof.
8.8 Proof of Corollary 3
In the following, we denote each player’s expected payoﬀ and each equilibrium as follows:
· EπP1i : Player i’s expected payoﬀ in the pooling equilibrium where θ is revealed for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
.
· EπP2i : Player i’s expected payoﬀ in the pooling equilibrium where θ is not revealed for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
.
· EπSi : Player i’s expected payoﬀ in the partially revealing separating equilibrium.
· PE1 : The pooling equilibrium where θ is revealed for all p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢.
· PE2 : The pooling equilibrium where θ is not revealed at all for all p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢.
· SE : The partially revealing separating equilibrium.
28
Case 1: When γ > 3φ+ 2
In this case, PE1, PE2 and SE exist.
First, we show that PE1 dominates SE. Consider PE1. In this equilibrium, M forecasts in round
1 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
and U deviates from am if observable. Hence, from (6), EπP1m = pγ − φ + pφ.
Also from (12), EπP1u = Eπu (au 6= am, w| tm = t1)|y= 1
2
=
¡
−14
¢
(3φ− γ). Next consider SE. As it is
actually a mixed strategy equilibrium, M’s expected payoﬀs are same regardless of the value of p. From
(9), EπSm = Eπm (tm = t1) =
1
2 (4p− φ+ pγ + pφ− 2). Also from (11) or (12) where y =
γ−φ
γ+φ+2 ,
EπSu =
γ−φ
γ+φ+2 . Then,
EπP1u −EπSu = −
(γ + φ) (3φ− γ + 2)
4 (γ + φ+ 2)
> 0
because our condition is that γ > 3φ+ 2. Also
EπP1m −EπSm =
1
2
(pγ − φ− 4p+ pφ+ 2)
Then p ≷ φ−2γ+φ−4 =⇒ EπPm ≷ EπSm. Note that φ−2γ+φ−4 − 12 = (φ−γ)2(γ+φ−4) < 0 because our condition is that
γ > 3φ+ 2 > φ. So for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, EπPm > EπSm. Therefore, PE1 dominates SE.
Second, we show that PE1 also dominates PE2. In PE2, M always delays his forecast and U should
randomize his forecast. Then from (3), EπP2m (tm = t2) =
1
2 (2p− φ+ pγ + pφ− 1). In the case of U’s
expected payoﬀ, if we assume that au = h,
EπP2u =
Z X
w∈{H,L}
X
θ∈{h,l}
Pr(w, θ)πu (au = h, am = θ, w) dZ (p| tm = t2)
=
Z
p∈( 12 ,1)
µ
−1
2
¶
(pγ − γ − 2p+ pφ+ 1) dZ (p)
=
µ
−1
8
¶
(3φ− γ − 2)
Then
EπP2m −EπP1m =
µ
−1
2
¶
(pγ − φ− 2p+ pφ+ 1) < 0
because p ≷ φ−1γ+φ−2 =⇒ EπP2m (tm = t2) ≶ EπP1m where φ−1γ+φ−2 − 12 = (φ−γ)2(γ+φ−2) < 0 for γ > φ. Also
EπP2u −EπP1u =
1
8
(3φ− γ + 2) < 0
because our condition is that γ > 3φ+ 2.
Finally, if γ > 3φ+ 2, PE1 dominates other equilibria in terms of expected payoﬀ.
Case 2: When γ = 3φ+ 2
In this case, there exist PE1 and PE2. In PE1, M forecasts in round 1 for all p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
and U
deviates from am if observable with probability 1− z ≥ 12 where 1− z = Pr(au 6= am). From (8), EπP1m =
z (p− (1− p))+(1−z)(pγ−(1−p)φ). Here it can be checked that ∂(Eπ
P1
m )
∂z = − (pγ − φ− 2p+ pφ+ 1) < 0
for γ = 3φ+2 > φ. Hence the value of Eπm (tm = t1) is minimized when z = 12 and the minimized value
is Eπm (tm = t1)|z=1
2
= 12 (2p− φ+ pγ + pφ− 1). In PE2, it was already checked (from Case 1) that
EπP2m (tm = t2) =
1
2 (2p− φ+ pγ + pφ− 1). So
EπP2m ≤ EπP1m
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for z ≤ 12 .
Next, in PE1 EπP1u =
1
2 from (A1) or (A2). Also in PE2, Eπ
P2
u
¯¯
γ=3φ+2 =
¡
−18
¢
(3φ− γ − 2) = 12 .
Then
EπP2u = Eπ
P1
u
So if γ = 3φ+ 2, PE1 (weakly) dominates PE2 in terms of expected payoﬀ.
Case 3: When φ < γ < 3φ+ 2
In this case, there exist SE and PE2. Here, SE is actually a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each
player should earn the same expected payoﬀ regardless of his strategy. From (9), EπSm =
1
2 (2p− φ+ pγ + pφ− 1).
Also from (1) or (2), EπSu = Eπu (au = am, w| tm = t1)|x= 3γ−φ+2
2γ+2φ+4
= γ−φγ+φ+2 . In PE2, from Case 1,
EπP2m =
1
2 (2p− φ+ pγ + pφ− 1) and EπP2u
¯¯
γ=3φ+2 =
¡
−18
¢
(3φ− γ − 2) = 12 . Then
EπP2m = Eπ
S
m
and
EπP2u −EπSu = −
(γ + φ− 2) (3φ− γ + 2)
8 (γ + φ+ 2)
< 0
because our condition is that γ < 3φ+ 2. So if φ < γ < 3φ+ 2, SE (weakly) dominates PE2 in terms of
expected payoﬀ.
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